IEEE C37.250-2020 pdf free download.IEEE Guide for Engineering, Implementaton, and Management of System Integrity Protecton Schemes.
1. Overview 1.1 General Power system conditions requiring mitigation beyond fault protection often are unique problems. The difficulties magnify when the power system, or a section of the power system, is cascading rapidly and system integrity requires rapid detection and remedy. Since the power system and sequence of cascading conditions may vary, System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) are intended to cover the specific circumstances necessary to protect the system. In most instances, however, general design concepts, commissioning principles, and management strategies are applicable to a wide range of SIPS. This guide documents concepts, principles, and strategies as applied in many deployed SIPS. Those responsible for system planning, engineering, implementation, and management of SIPS will benefit from the information provided in this guide. Not all SIPS are intended to be covered by this guide. SIPS that are covered are those that have a wide-area impact, usually require information exchange among multiple locations, and generally require a complex architecture. See 4.2 for a list of SIPS that are covered by this guide. 1.2 Scope This document provides guidance for engineering, implementation, and management of SIPS. General concepts for architecture and communication design to achieve functionality and performance requirements are addressed. The document also addresses principles for commissioning processes and strategies for life- cycle management. 1.3 Purpose This guide provides information to help properly engineer, implement, and manage SIPS. The document addresses general concepts for architecture and communication design to achieve functionality and performance requirements and principles for SIPS implementation and management.
The need for a SIPS and the actions it is intended to take are typically determined through system planning studies such as power fow, stability, and/or other modeling of the power system as part of the transmission operations function. For example, in North America, the system planning engineer typically models the contingencies specifed in the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) standard TPL-001. 9 System studies identify conditions when system performance is not acceptable. Although this process is not described here in signifcant detail, it is vital to recognize that this process identifes intent, high-level monitoring elements, and performance requirements for the scheme and is the basis for an engineering solution to implement the particular SIPS. System studies also assist in general understanding of monitoring and set points, arming and alarming elements to be engineered during the scheme design. The general objectives of this planning process are as follows: —Identify all critical single- or multiple-system contingencies that result in unacceptable system conditions. Usually these involve the unplanned unavailability or incorrect operation of one or more elements resulting in unanticipated system conditions from which the system may not be able to recover. Mitigation will result in a stable system that avoids prolonged stress to any portion of the system that would lead to further problems. —Identify the power system problem that results from the contingencies of concern. This problem is generally a violation of performance standards or other applicable planning or operating criteria. SIPS are typically designed to mitigate the effects of one or a limited set of specifc contingencies that result in unacceptable system conditions. —Identify any system confguration or system load or generation conditions that would make the system vulnerable to the critical contingencies.
—Identify performance requirements and response to mitigating actions. For example transient stability and some voltage stability problems may require rapid mitigation, whereas a thermal overload condition may accommodate some time delays. —These identifed control actions are what the SIPS is then designed to accomplish. The actions may include, but are not limited to, load shedding, generator rejection or ramping, system reconfguration, or switching of series or shunt reactive devices such as static VAR compensator (SVC), synchronous condenser, STATCOM, and so on. A more detailed control action list is included in 4.4. —In conjunction with the system protection function, determine how the system problem will be identifed. This may be equipment status (out of service), fault detection, equipment loading, or other pertinent system conditions.